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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
This is an appeal from a f i n a l judgment and from an Order on 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion t o C la r i f y Findings of Fact and Defendant's Motion for 
Court to Re-Evaluate Asse t s . These f i n a l r u l i n g s were made by the 
Honorable Ronald 0 . Hyde of the Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cour t , Weber 
County, State of Utah. J u r i s d i c t i o n is based on Rule 4 of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(g). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS (DISCRETION IN THE 
VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS BY (1) 
FAILING TO ESTABLISH THE VALUATION OF THE MARITAL 
RESIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN OFFER FO PURCHASE MADE BY 
THE APPELLANT; (2) FAILING TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EARLY 
WITHDRAWAL PENALTY AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH 
WITHDRAWAL IN VALUING THE APPELLANTS PENSION ASSETS; AND 
(3) FAILING TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT 
ITS FINAL ORDER OF VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION. 
RULES 
U.R.C.P. 52(a) 
Ef fec t . 
In a l l ac t ions t r i e d upon the f a c t s w i thou t a 
ju ry or wi th an advisory j u r y , the cour t sha l l f i n d the 
f a c t s s p e c i a l l y and state separately i t s conclusions of 
law thereon, and judgment sha l l be entered pursuant t o 
Rule 58A; in g r a n t i n g or r e f u s i n g i n t e r l o c u t o r y 
i n j u n c t i o n s the cour t sha l l s i m i l a r l y set f o r t h the 
f i n d i n g s of fact and conclusions of law which const i tu te 
the grounds of i t s ac t ion . Requests fo r f indings are not 
necessary f o r purposes of rev iew. The f i n d i n g s of a 
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, sha l l 
be considered as the f indings of the cour t . I t w i l l be 
su f f i c i en t i f the f indings of fact and conclusions of law 
are s ta ted o r a l l y and recorded in open court fo l lowing 
the c lose of the evidence or appear i n an op in ion or 
memorandum of dec i s ion f i l e d by the c o u r t . The t r i a l 
court need not enter f indings of fact and conclusions of 
law in r u l i n g s on mot ions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court s h a l l , however, issue a b r i e f w r i t t e n 
statement of the ground for i t s decision on a l l motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b ) , 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
U.R.C.P. 52(c) 
Waiver of F ind ings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
Except in ac t ions f o r d ivorce, f indings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the part ies to an 
issue of f ac t : 
(1) By d e f a u l t or by f a i l i n g to appear at the 
t r i a l ; 
(2) By consent in w r i t i n g , f i l e d in the cause; 
(3) By oral consent in open c o u r t , entered i n 
the minutes. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment in a divorce bench t r i a l and 
from the f i n a l order on post verdict Cross-motions for Clar i f icat ion by 
p l a i n t i f f and for re-evaluation of assets by defendant. Trial was held on 
February 23, 24 and 25, 1987. At the conclusion of the t r i a l , Judge Hyde 
issued a part ial verdict from the bench wi th respect to custody, ch i ld 
support, and v i s i t a t i o n . The f i n a l ru l ing on property distr ibut ion was 
made by way of a Memorandum Decision dated March 2, 1987. The Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree of Divorce were entered 
following a hearing held on post - t r ia l motions on June 5, 1987. 
This appeal concentrates on the valuation and award of the marital 
residence and the Appel l a n t f s t h r i f t p lan , a feature of his retirement 
benefit package through his employment. The Memorandum Decision and Decree 
establish the value of the residence at $90,000 and the value of the Thr i f t 
Plan at $24,000. The plaintiff/respondent was awarded the house, subject 
to a l ien in favor of the defendant/appellant. The defendant/appellant was 
awarded his retirement, including the Thr i f t Plan valued at $24,000. 
With the valuations set by the t r i a l cour t , the 
plaintiff/respondent and defendant/appellant received the following assets: 
To Plaintiff/Respondent: Home $90,000 
Car 1,693 
Furniture 4,340 
Jewelry 5,100 
Coins 2,405 
Mower & Snow Blower 800 
Retirement 12,197 
TOTAL $116,535 
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To Defendant/Appellant Furniture ! 
Ring 
Guns 
Pension 
Thr i f t Plan 
; 105 
300 
7,035 
41,000 
24,000 
TOTAL $72,440 
Defendant/appellant received a l i en of $22,000 against the home in 
order t o balance the d i s t r i b u t i o n . The l i en (is non-interest bearing and 
i 
must be paid by March 2, 1990. Plaintiff/Respondent's t o ta l award af ter 
deducting the l i en , is $94,535. 
The evidence at t r i a l on the value of the house consisted of an 
appraisal report prepared by an expert appraiser and offered by the 
p la in t i f f / respondent and an offer by the defendant/appellant to purchase 
the house made under oath in court . The appraisal set the value of the 
house at $96,500 and the offer to purchase was atj $120,000. 
The evidence at t r i a l on the value of tne t h r i f t plan consisted of 
exhib i ts from the defendant/appellant's employer and the testimony of the 
defendant/appellant that established a gros^ value of approximately 
$24,000. Other evidence indicated that the cfefendant/appellant would 
suffer a signif icant penalty and tax consequence were he to withdraw the 
t h r i f t p lan . The plan was cashed out and netted to approximately $10,000 
after t r i a l , but prior to the hearing on the post t r i a l motions. 
At the hearing on the post t r i a l c 
reiterated his rejection of the $120,000 offer ofi 
the value of the house and refused to reconsideij* the $24,000 valuation of 
the Thr i f t Plan. 
jross-motions, the judge 
purchase as evidence of 
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The discrepancy in the t h r i f t plan valuation as a result of the 
refusal by the court to consider early withdrawal l i a b i l i t y , is 
approximately $14,000. This d ispar i t y is 14.8% of the award to the 
defendant/appellant and 7.4% of the total assets. 
The discrepancy in the value of the house as a resu l t of the 
refusal of the court to consider the $120,000 offer to purchase is $30,000, 
based on the court's valuation of $90,000. This disparity is 32.7% of the 
award to the defendant/appellant and 15.8% of the total assets. 
The combined discrepancy in the valuat ion among the house, the 
t h r i f t p lan , and the overal l award is 46.5% of the award to the 
defendant/appellant and 23% of the total assets. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The t r i a l court relied on the valuation evidence provided by the 
p la in t i f f / respondent and ignored the defendant/appel lant 's evidence. 
Defendant/appellant's evidence was a better measure of the f a i r market 
value of the marital home. The court abused i ts discretion in adopting the 
plaintif f /respondent's evidence without giving any reason for i ts decision. 
The court was given ample evidence that the defendant/appellant 
would have to withdraw his t h r i f t plan funds and that such a withdrawal 
would resu l t in a large tax and withdrawal penalty loss. I t was error to 
disregard this evidence and assign a higher value to the t h r i f t plan. Such 
evidence is not speculative and must be taken into consideration. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were lacking in any 
discussion of how the t r i a l court reached i ts conclusion on the value of 
the home and t h r i f t plan. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE VALUATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY BY FAILING TO 
ESTABLISH THE VALUATION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE ON THE 
BASIS OF AN OFFER TO PURCHASE MADE BY THE APPELLANT 
I 
Factual f i nd ings 1 w i l l not be disturbed unless they are a clear 
abuse of discret ion, clearly erroneous or unjust:. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). Nonetheless, the t r i a l court cannot act a rb i t ra r i l y 
or on supposition or conjecture regarding facts upon which to base i t s 
r u l i n g . Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974). Moreover, i t is 
revers ib le error to select the wrong valuation technique. Percy v. Percy, 
564 P.2d 919, 115 Ariz. 230 (Ariz. App. 1977). 
The value of the t h r i f t plan was set at $24,000 (Memorandum 
Decision, Addendum Exhibi t No. "_£_," p.6, 116(1). The evidence on this 
issue consisted of the testimony of the p la in t i f f / respondent (Tr . 24, 
14-18) and p l a i n t i f f ' s Exhibit No. 7 (Tr. 28, 10-14), the defendant/appel-
lant tes t i f ied as to the tax and early withdrawal penalties associated with 
l iquidation of the t h r i f t plan (Tr. 221, 13-18; Tr. 222, 2-4). 
At the close of testimony, the court ruled on a l l issues except 
property d i s t r i b u t i o n , which was taken under advisement (Tr. 502, 17-20). 
Counsel for Mrs. Ellison undertook the draf t ing of f i nd ings , conclusions 
and judgment which were then submitted to Mr. E l l i son ' s counsel for 
Appellant recognizes that the determination of "value" is a question 
of f a c t . Valuation of Divorce Assets by Barth H. Goldberg, West 
Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, 1984, § 1 7 . 
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approval (Addendum Exhibi t "B " ) . Dispute arose over the f i nd ings , 
conclusions and judgment. Meanwhile the court prepared i t s Memorandum 
Decision (Addendum Exhibit " A " ) . 
In i ts Memorandum Decision, the court established the equity value 
of the marital home at $90,000 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law No. 
6, hereinafter referred to as Finding No. "X" or Conclusion No. "X"). The 
evidence of valuation consisted of an expert appraisal which set the value 
at $96,5002 (T r ia l Exhib i t 2; Tr . 9-10) and the testimony and offer of 
the Appellant in open court to purchase the home from the pla int i f f / respon-
dent for $120,000 (Tr. 239, 10-16). 
The object ive of the t r i a l court in considering the value of 
marital assets subject to division should be to determine the f a i r market 
value of each asset, unless an argument is made or the facts require that 
some other type of value be used. No argument was made in t h i s case that 
any value other than fa i r market value be used with respect to the marital 
residence. 
According to one au tho r i t y , the preferred valuat ion of real 
property is that which reflects i ts fa i r market value. Fair market value 
is " that pr ice at which a w i l l i n g buyer and a w i l l i ng sel ler w i l l sell a 
certain item of property, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell 
and both having a reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."3 In this case, 
Mr. El l ison was w i l l i n g , without compulsion, to purchase the home fo r 
2 
The mortgage debt was approximately $9,500. (Trial Transcript, page 
10, l ine 6) . 
3 
Valuation of Divorce Assets, Goldberg, §1.6. 
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testimony of husband that 
$120,000. He t e s t i f i e d to that effect under (lath (Tr. 239, 10-16). Mrs. 
E l l i son accepted as her value of the home tljie f igure prepared by the 
appraiser, Mr. Heiskamen (Tr . 9, 17-19; T r . | l 0 , 1-2). That amount was 
$96,500, not deducting the mortgage. 
A party is competent to give testimony of the value of real 
property and such valuat ion may be properly Considered by the cour t . 
Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985) ( 
cer ta in assets were valueless was valid evidence despite the fact that the 
wife's evidence set value at several thousand d o l l a r s ) . Mr. E l l i son ' s 
proposed valuation based on his offer of purchas^ of the home. 
The court was within the l imi ts of i ts c|iscretion in ru l i ng that 
Mrs. E l l ison did not have to sel l the home; hqwever, the court committed 
error by disregarding the fa i r market value of the home established by Mr. 
E l l i son ' s o f fer to purchase in favor of the appraisal offered by by Mrs. 
El l ison. 
The t r i a l court's apparent rejection of Mr. Ell ison's evidence of 
value was erroenous. His o f fe r was concrete ^nd ser ious. Though the 
Findings and Conclusions are si lent on the ultimate basis for the court's 
adoption of the $96,000 f igure, i t must be presumed that i t came from the 
appraisal and that the appraisal was based on comparable sales. However, 
there is no way for the Appeals Court to judge the v a l i d i t y of the t r i a l 
cour t ' s decision to adopt the lower f igure. In the face of this dearth of 
necessary deta i l , the most substantial evidence is Mr. E l l i son ' s o f fe r to 
purchase at $120,000. Although the t r i a l court called Mr. El l ison's offer 
"a meaningless bunch of nonsense," (Motion to Clar i fy , Tr. 22, 22-25), that 
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evidence i s the on ly evidence having any r e l a t i o n whatsoever t o the 
d e f i n i t i o n of market value. The court chose to go with the lower value to 
the detr iment of Mr. E l l i son without any explanation of why i t d i d , except 
to character ize Mr. E l l i son ' s o f fe r as "nonsense." The magnitude of t h i s 
e r r o r i s 31.7% of Mr. E l l i son ' s award. This di f ference alone is enough to 
warrant re-examination of the property d i s t r i b u t i o n in t h i s case. 
The e f f e c t of the cou r t ' s error was to require the t rans fe r of a 
disproport ionate share of the mari tal assets to Mrs. E l l i son ' s s ide of the 
ledger in order t o a f f e c t a "balance." Most s ign i f i can t among the other 
assets affected by t h i s er ror was Mr. E l l i son ' s pension fund. Although the 
cour t was again w i th in i t s d iscret ionary l i m i t s in awarding Mrs. E l l i son a 
share of Mr. E l l i son ' s pension assets, the amount is i n e r r o r due to the 
f a i l u r e to properly value the mari tal residence. 
The evidence regarding the value of the home was c o n t e s t e d . The 
cour t made no adequate f i nd ing regarding the basis of the value placed on 
the house by the cour t . The court f a i l e d to provide any explanat ion as to 
why i t accepted the va lue es tab l i shed by the appra ise r over t h a t 
es tab l i shed by Mr. E l l i s o n ' s o f f e r t o purchase. According to Larson v. 
La rson , 649 P.2d 1351 (Mont . 1982), the court has abused i t s d isc re t ion 
and must be reve rsed . The minimum requirement is that the f ind ings and 
conclusions explain why the cour t accepted one p a r t y ' s v a l u a t i o n s over 
those of the other . I d . at 1354. 
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IK 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE VALUATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS $Y FAILING TO TAKE 
INTO ACCOUNT THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL PENALTY AND TAX 
CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL IN VALUING THE 
APPELLANT'S PENSION BENlFlTT ' 
While employed at Kraft the defendarjt/appellant established a 
I 
defined contribution pension plan (Tr. 295, 3-8) known as the t h r i f t plan 
(Tr. 30, 2-3) . There was considerable controversy regarding the value of 
the t h r i f t plan due to the f luctuating nature of the return on the invest -
ments supporting the plan (Tr. 299, 14-25). Mr. E l l i son steadfast ly 
maintained that the value of the t h r i f t plan would be great ly reduced by 
I 
the tax ob l igat ion and early withdrawal penalty i f he were to withdraw i t 
before his retirement (Tr. 300, 10-16); Tr. 221, 15-20). Net of the tax 
and penalty, the t h r i f t plan was worth only approximately $10,000 according 
to Mr. Ell ison (Tr. 222, 2-4). 
The value of the t h r i f t plan was set at $24,000 by the t r i a l court 
(Memorandum Decision, Addendum Exhibit No. " A," [j>.6, 116(1). Although Mr. 
E l l i son t e s t i f i e d clearly that he was planning to withdraw the money from 
the t h r i f t plan immediately in order to either purchase the home from Mrs. 
E l l i son or to meet his other l i v i n g expenses [Tr . 301, 3-4), the t r i a l 
court based i ts refusal to consider the tax and penalty impl icat ions of 
withdrawal of the t h r i f t plan money on the mistaken notion that Mr. Ellison 
was not planning to withdraw the money (Motion to u a r i f y , Tr. 16, 21-23). 
Furthermore, when challenged as to this position by Mr. Ell isons1 counsel, 
the court stated abruptly that Mr. E l l i son had, Jin f a c t , withdrawn the 
money in "spite" (Motion to Clar i fy , Tr. 16, 24-2?; Tr. 17, 1-2). Neither 
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of these statements by the t r i a l cour t , given apparently as the basis fo r 
the valuat ion of the t h r i f t plan at $24,000, has any basis whatsoever. For 
the court to rule as i t d id on th i s issue, is clear e r ro r . 
I t is an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n to re fuse t o cons ider the tax and 
pena l t y i m p l i c a t i o n s of e a r l y w i thdrawal of pension f u n d s . The r u l e 
regarding consideration of tax and withdrawal consequences of a vo lun ta ry 
deferred compensation plan such as Mr. E l l i son f s is set fo r th in Koelsch v. 
Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234, 148 A r i z . 176 (1986). Although the general rule is 
t h a t cour ts should d e c l i n e t o consider the speculat ive fu ture ef fects of 
taxes and i n f l a t i o n , Johnson v . Johnson, 638 P.2d 705, 708, 131 A r i z . 38 
(1981) , in cases where the future matur i ty date is close to the t r i a l date 
and the tax consequences can be immediately and s p e c i f i c a l l y de te rmined , 
the cour t should cons ider the e f f e c t s of t a x a t i o n on the v a l u a t i o n . 
Koe lsch , at 1244. The same rule is establ ished in Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 
205 (Wyo. 1987): " In divorce sett lement, exercised d iscret ion by the t r i a l 
court requires federal income tax assessment." I d . at 208. 
In those cases ru l i ng that tax consequences are too speculat ive to 
consider, an important d i s t i n c t i o n must be made. Where the re i s evidence 
that the husband or wi fe is contemplating making an early withdrawal of the 
funds and that in ten t ion is introduced in to evidence at t r i a l , the element 
of specu la t i on i s removed and i t is proper for the court to consider the 
tax consequences. In re Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Col.App. 1984); 
In re Marriage of DiPasquale, 716 P.2d 223 (Mont. 1986). Moreover, absent 
a s p e c i f i c f i nd ing that consideration of tax consequences is precluded due 
-14-
t o the specu la t ion requ i red t o reach a c o n c l u s i o n , i t can be error to 
d i s regard such consequences. In re Marr iag^ of Rowe, 744 P.2d 717, 725 
(Ariz.App. 1987). 
In the case at hand, there was spec i f i c testimony that Mr. E l l ison 
intended to cash out the t h r i f t plan immediately (Tr . 235, 10 -17) . There 
was a lso tesimony that the loss of value due to the withdrawal would be in 
the area of 50% (Tr. 221, 15-20). Furthermore, concrete evidence of the 
ac tua l e f f ec t of the withdrawal was presented to the court at t r i a l and at 
the Motion to C l a r i f y (Motion t o C l a r i f y , T r . 21-22; T r . 225, 7 -19) . 
Despi te a l l t h i s , the cour t t reated the withdrawal as an act of " s p i t e , " 
(Motion to C l a r i f y , Tr . 16-17) without so much as a speck of evidence to 
support such a conc lus ion . This const i tutes reversible error on the part 
of the t r i a l judge. 
The case of Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987) does 
not reach a d i f f e r e n t conc lus ion . In that case, even though the Supreme 
Court sustained the lower cour t ' s dec i s ion whico refused to account f o r 
poss ib le tax consequences of a withdrawal in the 
ru l i ng was that such a d iscount would have to d 
about h y p o t h e t i c a l f u t u r e consequences." I d . 
s i g n f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . Not only d id Mr. E l l i j 
during t r i a l that he had decided t o wi thdraw the 
aspect of speculation by the time of the hearing 
which predated the signing of the F ind ings and Conc lus ions , Mr. E l l i s o n 
had, i n f a c t , wi thdrawn t h a t money and informed the court of the exact 
amount of the net withdrawal (Motion to C l a r i f y , T f . 22, 1-11). 
f u tu re , the basis of that 
epend on "specul a t [ i o n ] 
at 224. Our f a c t s are 
son indicate to the court 
money, t a k i n g away any 
[on the Motion to C l a r i f y , 
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The t r i a l cour t f s refusal to consider the tax and withdrawal 
penalties in this case is an error \/ery similar to that pointed out by the 
Supreme Court in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078. In that case, 
the d i s t r i c t court refused to place a value on a retirement account and 
medical assets claiming that they were " f u t u r i s t i c . " The Supreme Court 
ruled that the lack of specific findings resolving the d i f fer ing valuations 
of those assets was error. 
In th i s case, the t r i a l court refused to value the tax and 
withdrawal penalty claiming that i t was too speculat ive. However, there 
was ample evidence to show Mr. El l ison's f i rm plan to withdraw that money 
and what the factual consequence of the withdrawal was. The error in both 
cases is the same. 
The t r i a l court fs error in this respect resulted in a d i f ferent ia l 
to Mr. E l l i son of 14.8% of his award. The size of th i s error alone 
j u s t i f i e d reversal of the t r i a l court. The combined d i f ferent ia l in the 
valuation of the home and the t h r i f t plan amounts to 46.5% of the award to 
Mr. E l l ison. 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACT TO SUPPORT ITS DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
"Fai lure of the t r i a l court to make f indings on a l l material 
issues is revers ib le er ror unless the facts in the record are c lear , 
incontrover ted, and capable of supporting only a f inding in favor of the 
judgment." Acton v. De l i ran , 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). "The 
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence, "Gardner v, Gardner, 
I 
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (quoting from Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
423, 426 (Utah 1986)). "The findings "should be suf f ic ient ly detailed and 
I 
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
In part icular, where there is conf l ict ing evidence on valuation of 
mar i ta l assets, more precise f indings are required. Gardner at 1078; 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). 
In th is case, f indings of fact and conclusions of law were drawn 
f t of the standards set by 
mpleteness. The relevant 
up by Mrs. Ell ison's attorney. They f a l l far sho 
the Utah Supreme Court fo r suf f ic iency and co| 
findings and conclusions are quoted below: 
[Findings of Fact] 
6. That the parties have acquired asset^, including the 
following: J 
(a) A home at 333 South 7300 East, Huntsvil le, Utah, 
with an equity value of $90,000.00. [ . . . ] 
C . .] 
(1) A retirement plan accrued by defendant during 
th i s marriage known as the Kraft T h r i f t Plan worth 
$24,000.00. 
[Conclusions of Law] 
6. That p l a i n t i f f be awarded the following assets: 
(a) The home at 333 South 7300 Ea^t, Huntsvi l le, 
Utah, subject to the mortgage thereon. 
C • .] 
7. That defendant be awarded the following assets: 
C . .] 
(e) Al l of his retirement benefits accrued through 
the Kraft Pension Plan, together with! a l l of those 
benefits accrued through the Kraft Thr i f t Plan. 
8. That defendant be awarded a l ien against the home at 
333 South 7300 East, Huntsvil le, Utah, in the amount of 
$22,000.00. Said l ien shall be non-interest bearing and 
shall be payable by p l a i n t i f f at such time as she se l l s 
the home, or at such time as she remarries; provided, 
however, that said l ien shall be payable in any event not 
later than March 2, 1990. 
On March 2, 1987, Judge Hyde entered a Memorandum Decision. The 
following pertains to this argument: 
P l a i n t i f f is awarded the home with an equity value 
of $90,000.00. The 1984 Subaru, value $1,693; household 
f u rn i t u re and f i x t u r e s , valued at $4,340; her jewelry, 
$5,100; s i lver and gold coins in her possession, $2,405; 
lawn mower and snow blower, $800; her Utah State 
retirement, $12,197; for a total of $116,535. 
Defendant is awarded household f u rn i t u re and 
f ixtures in his possession, $105; his diamond r ing, $300; 
the Noble A f f i l i a t e Stock is not apparently a marital 
asset. He is awarded the gun c o l l e c t i o n , $7,035; his 
bank account apparently was non-existent, as he had to 
borrow money when he moved. I value his Kraft Pension 
Plan at $41,000; the Thr i f t Plan at $24,000, for a tota l 
of $72,400. In order to equalize the assets, the 
husband defendant is to have a l i en against the 
Huntsville home in the sum of $22,000* [. . . ] 
The only clue we have as to how the court established the f ina l 
value on the disputed items despite the defendant's evidence and protests 
at the hearing on the Motion to Clar i fy , is found in the transcript of the 
hearing on June 5, 1987. Mr. El l ison's attorney asked the court to c lar i fy 
the decision to value the home at $90,000.00 (Motion to Clar i fy , Tr. 17, 
12-23). The court responded f i r s t , that i t had lost i t s notes (Motion to 
C l a r i f y , Tr. 19, 21-22). The attorney again asked for c l a r i f i ca t i on . The 
court responded. 
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I set i t at 24 the date of the t r j i a l . I'm going to 
leave i t that way. His offer of $120,Q00 for the house 
is a meaningless bunch of nonsense. II put the value on 
the house and gave i t to her. Therefs {nothing in there 
to change (Motion to Clar i fy , Tr. 22, 22-25; 23, 1-2). 
With respect to the t h r i f t p lan , , Mr. E l l i son ' s attorney 
re i te ra ted the tax and penalty l i a b i l i t i e s , which, by then, had been 
realized, in fact (Motion to C la r i f y , Tr . 16, 15-24). The court stated 
I 
that i f Mr. El l ison, had removed the money and incurred the loss, he had 
done i t out of spite (Motion to Clar i fy, Tr. 16-17). There is no evidence 
anywhere to support the conclusion that the withdrawal was out of spi te. 
To the contrary, Mr. E l l i son stated at t r i a l ) his clear in tent ion to 
withdraw the money. 
Mr. E l l i son ' s attorney reminded the judge that no taxes had been 
withheld from the t h r i f t plan money and that i ts actual value was $10,819 
(Motion to C l a r i f y , Tr. 21-22). The court refused to reconsider and gave 
no reason except: "I set i t at 24 the date of tne t r i a l . I'm going to 
leave i t that way" (Motion to Clar i fy , Tr. 22, 22-23). 
Neither the findings and conclusions nor 1 the t ranscr ip ts reveal 
anything that comes close to sa t i s f y ing the s p e c i f i c i t y in f indings 
required by our Supreme Court. 
The t r i a l court did not include in i ts findings and conclusions 
any mention of the basis on which i t decided to adopt the valuat ion 
established by the appraiser. Without ident i f icat ion of the items that 
show that the decree fol lows l og i ca l l y from, and is supported by, the 
evidence, the Appeals Court has no basis on which to test the adequacy of 
that portion of the decree dealing with the value of the home. As was 
- 1 0 -
stated in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), M[t]he findings" 
should be s u f f i c i e n t l y deta i led and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." (C i t i ng Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 P.2d 1336 at 1338 (Utah 
1979) 
The valuation of the t h r i f t plan is void of any indication of how 
the court reached the decision to adopt the $24,000 f i g u r e . I t is not 
s u f f i c i e n t under Utah law to omit the detail and reference to subsidiary 
facts needed to reach the ultimate conclusion on each fact issue. Rucker 
v. Dalton, at 1338 (Utah 1979). 
We know that the court adopted the values sponsored by Mrs. 
Ell ison for both the home and the t h r i f t plan, but we do not know why. By 
the cour t ' s own statements, there is the appearance of an a rb i t r a r y 
dec is ion. Statements re fe r r ing to " sp i t e " and "meaningless bunch of 
nonsense" indicate t h i s . 
A court is free to adopt the recommendation of a party or a layman 
regarding valuation, but when faced with widely conf l ict ing valuations, the 
court must give reasons for the select ion of one value over another. 
Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279 (Mont. 1986). I f contested evidence is 
presented regarding the existence or valuation of an asset and no findings 
are made regarding that asset or no explanation is provided as to why the 
court accepted one party's valuation over that of the other, the court has 
abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . Larson v. Larson, 649 P.2d 1351, 200 Mont. 134 
(1982). 
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The Appeals Court should remand thisl case to the d is t r i c t court 
for adequate findings after reconsideration of $11 the facts re la t ing to 
these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The court committed reversible error in fa i l i ng to rely on the 
more substantial evidence of the value of the hortie provided by Mr. El l ison. 
I t also erred in f a i l i n g to account for the tax and early withdrawal 
consequences re la t ing to the t h r i f t p lan . The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were insuff icient to allow review by the Appeals Court. 
The total effect of the court's error amounts to 46.5% of the award to the 
defendant/appel lant. For these reasons, the t r f a l court's rulings on the 
value of the home and the t h r i f t plan should pe reversed and the case 
should be remanded for the preparation of adequate Findings of Fact and 
Conslusions of Law. 
DATED this / f * d a y of July 1988. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
L. Zane/Gill c V 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
day of July 1988, I caused to I hereby cer t i fy that on the / C 
be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant in the above-entitled matter to the following: 
C. Gerald Parker 
PARKER, THORLEY & CRITCHLOW 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P.O. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON,' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 94781 
In the hearing of this matter), I gave a bench ruling on 
all matters other than a division of ^he assets, and they shall 
be as follows: 
Plaintiff is awarded the home, with an equity value of 
I 
$90,000; the 1984 Subaru, value $1,69^; household furniture and 
fixtures, valued at $4,340; her jewelrjf, $5,100; silver and gold 
coins in her possession, $2,405; lawn mower and snow blower, 
$800; her Utah State retirement, $|12,197; for a total of 
$116,535. 
Defendant is awarded household furniture and fixtures in 
his possession, $105; his diamond ring,,$300; the Noble Affiliate 
Stock is not apparently a marital asset. He is awarded the gun 
collection, $7,035; his bank account apparently was non-existent, 
as he had to borrow money when he moved. I value his Kraft 
Pension Plan at $41,000; the Thrift Plari at $24,000, for a total 
of $72,440. In order to equalize the assets, the husband 
EXHIBU 
defendant is to have a lien against the Huntsville home in the 
sum of $22,000. The lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall 
be payable if the wife sells the home or remarries. As to having 
it due when the youngest child reaches majority, this is far too 
long a period of time. The home can easily be refinanced, and it 
would be recommended that it be done while interest rates are 
low. At any rate, the time period for re-payment shall not 
exceed three years from date. 
DATED this ^ _ day of March, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to C. Gerald Parker, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 2610 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 
84401, and to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Defendant, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this Jj day of March, 1987. 
C. G e r a l d P a r k e r f #2520 
PARKER/ THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
2610 Washington B lvd . 
p . 0 . Box 107 
Ogden# Utan 84402 
Te lephon e : 399-3 303 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAII 
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON/ 
Plaintiff/ 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON/ 
De fen dan t. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94781 
The above-ent i t led action camel on regular ly for t r i a l 
commencing the 23rd day of February, 1987/ and continuing through 
February 24 and February 25/ before the Honorable Ronald O. Hydef 
one of the Judges of the above-ent i t led Court s i t t i n g without a 
jury ; the p l a i n t i f f appeared in person arid was represented by ner 
I I 
counsel/ C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant appeared in person 
and was represented by h i s counsel/ Pete N. Vlahos. The Court 
I 
heard evidence introduced on behalf of bojth of the p a r t i e s / 
including testimony from several witnessed on behalf of each 
EXHIBIT 
) 
i o 
> 
Z U M 
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p a r t y , and a f t e r b e i n g f u l l y a d v i s e d in t h e p r e m i s e s , t h e C o u r t 
made a p a r t i a l r u l i n g and then t o o k t h e r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s u n d e r 
a d v i s e m e n t . I h e C o u r t t h e r e a f t e r i s s u e d i t s Memorandum D e c i s i o n 
r e g a r d i n g t h e r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s and now makes t n e f o l l o w i n g : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . T h a t p l a i n t i f f i s a bona f i d e and a c t u a l r e s i d e n t of 
) < Weber C o u n t y , U t a h , and h a s been fo r more t n a n t h r e e months 
-> §
 h 5 immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
£ <D 0 <D 
y 2 Z I 
w P o £ 2 . Tha t p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t were m a r r i e d t o e a c h 
E - o z 
o J o: S o t h e r a t Eden, U t a h , on J u n e 1 8 , 1970 , and e v e r s i n c e s a i d t i m e 
H
 * o 
as o have been and now are husband and wife. 
< 3. Ihat the parties are the parents of three minor 
children, to-wit: LINDA LEE ELLISON, age 10 years, born June 4, 
1976; DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, age 7 years, born October 8, 1979; and 
ELIZABETH KATHRYN ELLISON, age 2 years, born April 2, 1984. 
Plaintiff has by far better parenting ski l ls than does defendant, 
and the best interests of the children will be served by their 
custody being awarded to plaintiff . P la int i f f ' s parenting sk i l l s 
are superior to those of defendant in ner ab i l i t i e s as a nomemaker 
and the fact that the children are cared for in their own home by 
their maternal grandmother while plaintiff is at work, as opposed 
- 2 -
t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p roposa l t h a t t ne childlren would be cared for in 
daycare c e n t e r s were they in h i s custody* P l a i n t i f f a l s o has 
b e t t e r s k i l l s in insu r ing t h a t the c h i l d r e n a r e w e l l - f e d , c l o t h e d , 
groomed, and educa ted . She has b e t t e r s k i l l s in d i s c i p l i n i n g t h e 
c h i l d r e n by sending them t o t h e i r room o r wi thholding t e l e v i s i o n , 
as opposed t o d e f e n d a n t ' s t h r e a t e n i n g em with h i s b e l t . 
P l a i n t i f f i s more s e n s i t i v e t o the emot ional needs of the 
i | c n i l d r e n , a s evidenced by h e r encouraging a loving r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i Q I 
o< between them and t h e i r f a t h e r , as opposed t o h i s a t t e m p t s t o turn 
0
 g
 h 5 the c h i l d r e n from h e r by t e l l i n g them t h a t she had given a baby 
cB ffl 0 oo 
> Z X X 
ygo£ away. P l a i n t i f f ' s e d u c a t i o n a l and employment expe r i ence have 
i i o 2* 
o 11 g enhanced h e r p a r e n t i n g s k i l l s , in t h a t she has a B a c h e l o r ' s Degree 
H
 £ o 
of 2 in Elementary Educat ion, a M a s t e r ' s Degree in Spec ia l Education 
< with emphasis on the b e h a v i o r i l y handicapped , t he i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
handicapped , and those who have l e a rn ing d i s a b i l i t i e s . She a l s o 
has an a d d i t i o n a l 70 hours of p o s t g r a d u a t e educat ion in counse l ing 
i 
and she has had approximate ly f ive years! expe r i ence as a 
p r o f e s s i o n a l counse lo r a t Ogden High School . 
The Court in terv iewed each of the c h i l d r e n a t l eng th 
i n d i v i d u a l l y and i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t based upon t h e i r f e e l i n g s and 
i 
d e s i r e s , and t h e f ind ings made above, t h ^ t t h e i r b e s t i n t e r e s t 
i 
w i l l be se rved by t h e i r custody being awarded to p l a i n t i f f . 
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4 . R e g a r d i n g v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s , t h e Cour t f i n d s t h a t 
r i o u s p r o b l e m s e x i s t with r e g a r d t o d e f e n d a n t v i s i t i n g t h e 
i l d r e n and t h a t such d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e n o t l i k e l y t o i m p r o v e , b u t 
e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t e m p o r a r i l y d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o h a v e 
^..e r i g h t t o t a k e t h e c h i l d r e n f o r v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t e 
w e e k e n d s . 
5 . T h a t d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e m a r r i a g e , d e f e n d a n t 
l a s t r e a t e d p l a i n t i f f c r u e l l y , c a u s i n g g r e a t men ta l d i s t r e s s . His 
! o 
;5 c r u e l t r e a t m e n t h a s i n c l u d e d e m b a r r a s s i n g and demeaning p l a i n t i f f 
• > 
; w CM 
' o h 5 * n P u b l i c ? c o n t i n u a l l y t h r e a t e n i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e m a r r i a g e t o t e l l 
i 0 0 © 
a o § < neighbors and friends that plaintiff had given birth to a child 
J £ o D 7 
I i ^ u ou t of wedlock which s h e had p l a c e d fo r a d o p t i o n , n o t w i t n s t a n d m g 
r < § 
~ > o 
x o t h e f a c t t h a t h e was aware of such i n c i d e n t a t t h e t ime ne m a r r i e d 
% p l a i n t i f f ; and by s u b s e q u e n t l y r e l a t i n g s a i d i n c i d e n t t o members 
Q. 
of t h e communi ty ; and by c a u s i n g c o n s t a n t t u r m o i l and a n x i e t y and 
f e a r w i t h i n t h e f a m i l y u n i t . 
6 . T h a t t h e p a r t i e s have a c q u i r e d a s s e t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e 
f o l l o w i n g : 
( a ) A home a t 333 South 7300 E a s t , 
H u n t s v i l l e , U t a h , witn an e q u i t y v a l u e of 
$ 9 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Sa id p r o p e r t y now s t a n d s in t h e 
_ 4 -
u < 
H > 
0 r* <t 
co ID 0 CD 
names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON and SUZANNE WOOD 
ELLISON, and the legal description thereof is as 
follows: 
P a r t of Lot 2 , Block 1 , P la t j C, H u n t s v i l l e 
S u r v e y , Weber County , U t a h : j Beginning a t t n e 
N o r t h e a s t c o r n e r of s a i d Lot! 2 ; t h e n c e South 
2 7 1 . 6 f e e t ; t h e n c e Nor th 8D4?1 'West 1 1 7 . 7 5 f e e t ; 
t h e n c e Nor th 41D5 3 ' West 2 2 . t) f e e t ; t h e n c e North 
14 r o d s ; t h e n c e E a s t 8 r o d s t o b e g i n n i n g , 
I 
(b) A 1984 Subaru v a l u e d a t $ 1 , 6 9 3 . 0 0 . 
(c ) Household f u r n i t u r e and f u r n i s h i n g s in 
^ w < M p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s s e s s i o n v a l u e d a t $ 4 , 3 4 0 . 0 0 . 
O N <* 
(d) P l a i n t i f f ' s j e w e l r y va lued a t 
$ 5 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 . 
y 21 ? 
4 5 • = 
i | o z 
H | g ( e ) S i l v e r and g o l d coiifis in p l a i n t i f f ' s 
x o 
* 5 p o s s e s s i o n , worth $ 2 , 4 0 5 . 0 0 . 
( f ) Lawnmower and snowblower wor th 
$ 8 0 0 . 0 0 . 
(g) Utah S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s a c c r u e d 
I 
by p l a i n t i f f in t h e sum of $ 1 2 , 1 9 7 . 0 0 . 
(h) Household f u r n i t u r e land f i x t u r e s in 
I 
d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s s e s s i o n worth $ 1 0 5 . 0 0 . 
i ( i ) D e f e n d a n t ' s diamond }ring wor th 
$ 3 0 0 . 0 0 . 
( j ) A gun c o l l e c t i o n wortjh $ 7 , 0 3 5 . 0 0 . 
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(k) A pension plan known as the Kraft 
Pension Plan, the value of whicn was accrued by 
defendant during t h i s marriage in the sum of 
$41,000.00. 
(1) A re t i rement plan accrued by defendant 
during t h i s marriage known as the Kraft Thrif t 
Plan worth $24,000.00. 
(m) Personal e f fec ts of each par ty . 
0 
$ 7. That plaintiff is employed as a counselor at Ogden 
> 
j " gh$ High School with a ne t income of approximately $1,885.00 per 
m o co 
0 § S month . D e f e n d a n t i s employed a s a s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a t K r a f t , 
1 o z 
5 ^ Inc., with a taxable income of approximately $2,167.00 per month. 
£ o 
o 8. That defendant has medical and dental insurance 5 
ava i l ab le for the children through h i s employment. 
9. That the p a r t i e s nave outstanding f inancia l 
indebtedness . 
10. That each par ty has re ta ined legal counsel to 
represent them in these proceedings and each has incurred 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and court cos t s he re in . 
From tne foregoing findings of f ac t , the Court a r r i v e s 
as the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . That p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d t o a Decree of D i v o r c e 
from t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e same t o become! f i n a l on t h e d a t e t h e 
d i v o r c e d e c r e e i s s i g n e d by t h e Cour t ^nd e n t e r e d by t h e C l e r k in 
t h e R e g i s t e r of A c t i o n s . 
§ 2 . Tha t p l a i n t i f f be awarded t n e c a r e , c u s t o d y and 
3 I 
= Q Q% control of the three minor cnildren of the parties, to-wit: LINDA 
H > 
0 3 § LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN ELLISON. 
u r* *t 
cQ (D 0 on 
ui o g < T e m p o r a r i l y , d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be g r a n t e d ! t h e r i g h t t o t a k e t h e 
5J 5 • = 
o j „• 2 c h i l d r e n f o r v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t e weekends . Each p a r t y i s 
H
 £ o 
of o enjoined and restrained from attempting to alienate the children 
^ from the other party and from making derogatory or demeaning 
remarks about the other party in the presence of the children. 
3# That plaintiff be awarded J and defendant be required 
to pay to plaintiff, the sum of $139.00 Iper month for the support 
and maintenance of each of the children, for a total of $417.00 
per month child support. Said support snail be paid through the 
office of the Clerk of Weber County, Utah in two equal semi-
monthly installments, with one-half of ttje total payment to be 
made on or before the 5th day of each mor|th and a like amount to 
0 
be p a i d on o r b e f o r e t h e 20th day of each month . Sa id s u p p o r t 
s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 7 8 - 4 5 d - l , e t s e q . , 
Utah Code A n n o t a t e d . 
4 . Tha t d e f e n d a n t be r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n m e d i c a l and 
d e n t a l i n s u r a n c e on t h e c n i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s t h r o u g n h i s 
employment , and each p a r t y s h a l l be r e q u i r e d t o pay o n e - h a l f of 
any sucn e x p e n s e s vrtiich a r e n o t c o v e r e d by i n s u r a n c e . 
5e Tha t each p a r t y be r e q u i r e d t o pay any d e b t s he o r 
5< s h e h a s i n c u r r e d s i n c e t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . 
i j * 
J §
 h ; 6. That plaintiff be awarded the following assets: 
aQ Q 0 O 
ujog< ( a ) The home a t 333 South *7300 E a s t , 
4 5 • a 
i 5 d z 
o J o: S H u n t s v i l l e , U tah , s u b j e c t t o t h e mor tgage 
H
 * o 
of o t h e r e o n . 
LxJ i 
< (b) The 1984 S u b a r u , s u b j e c t t o t h e d e b t 
t h e r e o n . 
( c ) A l l o f t h e h o u s e h o l d f u r n i t u r e and 
f i x t u r e s now in h e r p o s s e s s i o n . 
(d) Her j e w e l r y , t o g e t h e r wi th t h e s i l v e r 
and g o l d c o i n s in h e r p o s s e s s i o n . 
( e ) The lawnmower and snowblower . 
( f ) Her Utah S t a t e r e t i r e m e n t . 
(g) Her p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s . 
7 . Tha t d e f e n d a n t be awarded t h e f o l l o w i n g a s s e t s : 
- 8 -
i S 
H > 
Q_ 
( a ) Hie h o u s e h o l d f u n i i t u r e and f i x t u r e s 
now in h i s p o s s e s s i o n . 
(b) His diamond r i n g , 
( c ) The Noble A f f i l i a t e s t o c k vrtiicn i s 
c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Cour t t o ble a n o n - m a r i t a l 
a s s e t . 
(d) The gun c o l l e c t i o n ^ 
( e ) A l l of h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s a c c r u e d 
o< t h r o u g h t h e K r a f t P e n s i o n P l ^ n , t o g e t h e r wi th 
£ J 6 I 
u g h « a l l of t h o s e b e n e f i t s a c c r u e d t h r o u g n t n e K r a f t 
cO m o oo 
u o § < T h r i f t P l a n . 
* : • ' 
X - 0 Z 1 
o I a; s 8 . T h a t d e f e n d a n t be awarded a l i e n a g a i n s t t h e home a t 
H
 * o 
of o 333 South 7300 E a s t , H u n t s v i l l e , U t a h , jjln t h e amount of 
UJ « 
< $ 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Sa id l i e n s h a l l be n o n - i n t e r e s t b e a r i n g and s h a l l be p a y a b l e by p l a i n t i f f a t such t i m e a s sh4 s e l l s t h e home, o r a t 
such t ime a s s h e r e m a r r i e s ; p r o v i d e d , hdweve r , t h a t s a i d l i e n 
s h a l l be p a y a b l e in any e v e n t n o t l a t e r t han Marcn 2 , 1990. 
9 . Tha t each p a r t y be r e q u i r e d t o pay any a t t o r n e y ' s 
I 
f e e s and Cour t c o s t s he o r s h e h a s i n c u r r e d h e r e i n . 
1 0 . T h a t each p a r t y be r e q u i r e d t o e x e c u t e any d e e d s , 
c o n v e y a n c e s , a s s i g n m e n t s , c e r t i f i c a t e s ok t i t l e , o r o t h e r 
documen t s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t t h e t r a n s f e r s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
- 9 -
Le t j udgmen t be e n t e r e d a c c o r d i n g l y * 
DATED t h i s day of , 1987, 
Ronald 0 . Hyde 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
Approved a s t o form and c o n t e n t : 
j
 0 P e t e N. V lahos 
5$ A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
- > 
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C. G e r a l d P a r k e r , #2520 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
2610 Washington B lvd . 
P. 0 . Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
T e l e p h o n e : 399-3 303 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT O^ WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
C ^ v i l No. 94781 
The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d a c t i o n carrie on r e g u l a r l y f o r t r i a l on 
t h e 23rd day of F e b r u a r y , 1987 , and c o n t i n u i n g t h rough F e b r u a r y 24 
and F e b r u a r v 2 5 , b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e Ronald O. Hyde, one of t h e 
J u d g e s of t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d C o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y . The 
p l a i n t i f f a p p e a r e d in p e r s o n and was r e p r e s e n t e d by h e r c o u n s e l , 
C. G e r a l d P a r k e r , and t h e d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d in p e r s o n and was 
r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s c o u n s e l , P e t e N. V l a n o s . t h e Cour t h e a r d 
e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d on b e h a l f of b o t h ofj t h e p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g 
t e s t i m o n y of s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s on b e h a l f of each p a r t y , and 
r e n d e r e d i t s d e c i s i o n from t h e bench r e g a r d i n g c e r t a i n i s s u e s and 
t o o k t h e r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s unde r a d v i s e m e n t , and t h e r e a f t e r i s s u e d 
i t s Memorandum D e c i s i o n . Now by v i r t u e of t h e law and p r e m i s e s , 
in a c c o r d a n c e wi th t h e f a c t s found and c o n c l u s i o n s of law 
a f o r e s a i d , i t i s h e r e b y 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 . Tha t p l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d a Decree of D i v o r c e 
from d e f e n d a n t , and t h e bonds of mat r imony now and h e r e t o f o r e 
e x i s t i n g be tween t h e p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t a r e h e r e b y d i s s o l v e d , 
o 
$ and t h e p a r t i e s a r e h e r e b y r e s t o r e d t o t h e s t a t u s of u n m a r r i e d 
> 
0 r> f p e r s o n s , wi tn s a i d d e c r e e t o become f i n a l on t h e d a t e s a i d d e c r e e 
m o © 
o§< i s s i g n e d by t h e C o u r t and e n t e r e d by t h e C l e r k in t h e R e g i s t e r of 
0 ffl 3 
1 o: | A c t i o n s . 
< o 
* o 
2 . T h a t p l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y awarded t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y 
and c o n t r o l of t h e t h r e e minor c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s , t o - w i t : 
LINDA LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN 
ELLISON. T e m p o r a r i l y , d e f e n d a n t s h a l l be g r a n t e d t h e r i g h t t o 
t a k e t h e c h i l d r e n f o r v i s i t a t i o n on a l t e r n a t e weekends . Each 
p a r t y i s e n j o i n e d and r e s t r a i n e d from a t t e m p t i n g t o a l i e n a t e t h e 
c h i l d r e n from t h e o t h e r p a r t y and from making d e r o g a t o r y o r 
demeaning r e m a r k s a b o u t t h e o t h e r p a r t y in t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e 
c h i l d r e n . 
3 . T h a t p l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d , and d e f e n d a n t i s 
h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o pay t o p l a i n t i f f , t h e sum of $139 .00 p e r month 
- 2 -
0 
f o r t h e s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e of ea<±h of t h e c h i l d r e n , fo r a 
t o t a l of $ 4 1 7 . 0 0 p e r , m o n t h c h i l d s u p p o r t . Sa id s u p p o r t s h a l l be 
p a i d t h r o u g h t h e o f f i c e of t h e C l e r k of Weber County , Utah in two 
e q u a l s e m i - m o n t h l y i n s t a l l m e n t s , w i th o n e - h a l f of t h e t o t a l 
payment t o be made on o r b e f o r e t h e 5tn day of each month and a 
l i k e amount t o be p a i d on o r b e f o r e t h e 20th day of each month . 
Sa id s u p p o r t s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of T i t l e 7 8 - 4 5 d - l , 
e t s e q . , Utah Code A n n o t a t e d . 
I 4 . T h a t d e f e n d a n t i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o m a i n t a i n m e d i c a l 
o 
- i 
x 
o < 
*- >. 
00 3 % and d e n t a l i n s u r a n c e on t h e c h i l d r e n of t h e p a r t i e s t h r o u g h h i s 
ffl c« O 0 CO 
Z ** I 
- ui o § < employment , and each p a r t y i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o pay o n e - h a l f of 
i 3! S • 3 I 
^ o 1
 i S any such e x p e n s e s which a r e n o t c o v e r e d \l I § J
 *~ S o 
by i n s u r a n c e . 
of 0 5 . T h a t each p a r t y i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o pay any d e b t s 
UJ o 
I h e o r s n e h a s i n c u r r e d s i n c e t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e p a r t i e s . 
CL 
6. T h a t p l a i n t i f f i s h e r e b y ^warded t h e f o l l o w i n g 
a s s e t s : 
( a ) The home a t 333 Soukh 7300 E a s t , 
H u n t s v i l l e , U tah , s u b j e c t t o t h e mor tgage 
t h e r e o n . S a i d home now s t a n d s of r e c o r d in t h e 
names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON and SUZANNE WOOD 
ELLISON, and t h e l e g a l d e s c r i p t i o n t h e r e o f i s a s 
f o l l o w s : 
- 3 -
Part of Lot 2, Block 1, Plat C, Huntsville 
Survey, Weber Countyf Utah: Beginning at the 
Northeast corner of said Lot 2; thence South 
271.6 feet; thence North 82D421 West 117.75 
feet; thence North 41D53' West 22.0 feet; thence 
North 14 rods; thence East 8 rods to beginning. 
(b) The 1984 Subaru, subject to the debt 
thereon. 
(c) All of the household furniture and 
fixtures now in her possession. 
p (d) Her jewelry, together with the silver 
and gold coins in her possession. 
(e) The lawnmower and snowblower. 
< 
\ \ 
o h ^ 
i Q O f l 
. z Z i 
I o ffl : : ? / (f) Her Utah State retirement. 
-\ \ (g) Her personal effects. 
£ 2 
* S 7. Ihat defendant is hereby awarded the following 
assets: 
(a) The household furniture and fixtures 
now in his possession. 
(b) His diamond ring. 
(c) The Noble Affiliate stock which is 
considered by the Court to be a non-marital 
asset. 
(d) The gun collection. 
( e ) A l l of h i s r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t s 
a c c r u e d t h r o u g h t h e K r a f t Pens ion P l a n , t o g e t h e r 
w i t h a l l of t h o s e b e n e f i t s 4 c c r u e d t h rough t h e 
K r a f t T h r i f t P l a n , 
8 . T h a t d e f e n d a n t i s hereoyi awaraed a l i e n a g a i n s t t h e 
home a t 333 South 7300 E a s t , H u n t s v i l l e , U t a h , in t h e amount of 
$ 2 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Sa id l i e n s h a l l be n o n - i n t e r e s t b e a r i n g and s h a l l be 
5 p a y a b l e by p l a i n t i f f a t such t i m e a s s h e s e l l s t h e nome o r a t such 
o \ 
g* t i m e a s s h e r e m a r r i e s ; p r o v i d e d , howeve r , t h a t s a i d l i e n s h a l l be 
fc > 
DUD ° p a y a b l e in any e v e n t n o t l a t e r t h a n March 2 , 1990 . 
O h * \ 
" cQ IB 0 CD 
U I & o £ < 9 . Tha t each p a r t y i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o pay any 
5 z 1 • • 
! n i ° S a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and c o u r t c o s t s h e o r s n e h a s i n c u r r e d h e r e i n . 
<£ o ° 1 0 . T h a t each p a r t y i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o e x e c u t e any 
* w 
^ d e e d s , c o n v e y a n c e s , a s s i g n m e n t s , c e r t i f i c a t e s of t i t l e , o r o t n e r 
a. 
d o c u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o e f f e c t t h e t r a n s f e r s s e t f o r t h h e r e i n . 
DATED t h i s day o f _ _ , , 1 9 8 7 . 
Ronald d). Hyde 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
Approved a s t o form and c o n t e n t : 
P e t e N. Vlahos 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendan t 
- 5 -
C. Gerald Parker, #2520 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P. 0. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
a: 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
CLARIFY FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 94781 
WHEREAS, the above-entitled case was tried before the 
Court on February 23, 24 and 25, 1987, and plaintiff's attorney 
was instructed by the Court to prepare proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, and 
WHEREAS, said attorney has prepared a proposed draft of 
said documents and submitted them to defendant's attorney for his 
approval, and 
WHEREAS, defendant's counsel has filed an objection to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce, 
o 
4 Q 
w
 a = v z 
| g i * 8 
NOW, THEREFORE, plaintiff, I by and through her attorney, 
C. Gerald Parker, hereby moves the Cpurt to clarify and define the 
specific Findings of Fact as they relate to custody of the 
I 
children of the parties. A copy- of the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment alnd Decree of Divorce are 
attached hereto for the information ojf the Court. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987. 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
I— uB 
o < 
k i S g B y , , , 
2«2SS C/ Gerald Parker 
» > * - * Attorneys for Plaintiff 
cygo? 2610 Washington Blvd. 
S i 5 d J P. p. Box 107 
Ogdein, Utah 84402 
X 0 
I " ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF\RECEIPT 
I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Clarify Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, this day of May, 1987. 
Pete N.j Vlahos 
Attorney for Defendant 
- 2 -
